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Abstract
Let G = (V ,E) be a graph. A set S ⊆ V is a defensive alliance if |N [x] ∩ S| |N [x] − S| for every x ∈ S. Thus, each vertex
of a defensive alliance can, with the aid of its neighbors in S, be defended from attack by its neighbors outside of S. An entire set
S is secure if any subset X ⊆ S can be defended from an attack from outside of S, under an appropriate deﬁnition of what such a
defense implies. Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for a set to be secure are determined.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Alliances in graphs is a relatively new concept introduced by Kristiansen et al. [12]. Let G = (V ,E) be a graph. If
x ∈ V and S ⊆ V , then N(x) = {y ∈ V : xy ∈ E}, N [x] = N(x) ∪ {x}, N(S) = ∪v∈SN(v), and N [S] = N(S) ∪ S.
The set S = N [S] − S is the boundary of S. The subgraph induced by S, that is, the subgraph (S,E ∩ (S × S)), is
denoted 〈S〉. A defensive alliance is a subset S of V such that x ∈ S implies |N [x] ∩ S| |N [x] − S|. One can think
of the vertices of N [x] − S as attackers of x and those of N [x] ∩ S as defenders of x. Thus, for any x in a defensive
alliance, there are at least as many defenders as there are attackers, and any attack on a single vertex can be thwarted.
Previous studies on alliances and their variations include [1–11,13–15].
Defensive alliances, as deﬁned above, involve the defense of a single vertex. In more realistic settings, alliances are
formed so that any attack on the entire alliance or any subset of the alliance can be forestalled. This paper represents
an attempt to develop a model of this situation. We will call a set S ⊆ V secure if, for any subset X ⊆ S, an attack
on all the vertices of X can be repelled. There are several ways one might deﬁne what is meant by this. We take the
approach that an attacker y (a member of N [X] − S) can attack only a single vertex of X at a given time, even if y is a
neighbor of several vertices of X. Furthermore, a defender x (a member of N [X] ∩ S) can turn back, at a given time,
only one attacker which can be attacking itself or a neighbor of x in X. Notice that a defender x need only be in S and
not necessarily in X. These ideas are embodied in the formal deﬁnition below.
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Deﬁnition 1. 1. Let G = (V ,E) be a graph. For any S = {s1, s2, ..., sk} ⊆ V , an attack on S is any k mutually
disjoint sets A = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak} for which Ai ⊆ N [si] − S, 1 ik. A defense of S is any k mutually disjoint sets
D = {D1,D2, . . . , Dk} for which Di ⊆ N [si] ∩ S, 1 ik. Attack A is defendable if there exists a defense D such
that |Di | |Ai | for 1 ik.
2. Set S is secure if and only if every attack on S is defendable.
3. A subset X ⊆ S is S-secure if every attack on S in which Ai = ∅ whenever si /∈X is defendable. For convenience,
when X is a proper subset of S, we will not explicitly mention the empty Ais for si /∈X.
Note that sets S that are not secure can have S-secure subsets. Since the entire vertex set is a secure set, there must
be at least one secure set of minimum size. The cardinality of a minimum secure set in graph G is the security number
of G and is denoted s(G). A secure set of cardinality s(G) is called an s(G)-set.
2. Elementary properties of secure sets
The following observation summarizes several properties of secure sets that derive easily from the deﬁnition.
Observation 2. Let G = (V ,E) and X ⊆ S ⊆ V .
1. If there is an attack on X by a proper subset of N [X] − S that is not defendable, there is an attack on X utilizing all
the attackers in N [X] − S that is not defendable.
2. A defendable attack on a proper subset of X is a defendable attack on X.
3. If X is S-secure, |N [X] ∩ S| |N [X] − S|.
4. S is secure if and only if X is S-secure for every X ⊆ S.
5. A minimum secure set is connected.
Unions of disjoint secure sets are secure sets, as the next proposition shows.
Proposition 3. If S1 and S2 are vertex disjoint secure sets in the same graph, then S1 ∪ S2 is a secure set.
Proof. Any attack on S1 ∪S2 can be considered to be an attack on S1 using vertices of S1 −S2 and on S2 using vertices
of S2 − S1. Notice that, by deﬁnition, a vertex in S1 ∩ S2 can attack only one of S1 and S2. Thus the attacking force
on Si in S1 ∪ S2, i = 1 or 2, is a subset of a possibly larger attacking force of Si alone. Since Si is secure alone, such
attacks can be repulsed, so S1 ∪ S2 is secure. 
The values of the security number are known or bounded for some classes of graphs. In the following proposition,
the cartesian product of graphs G and H is denoted GH .
Proposition 4. Let G be a graph.
1. (a) s(G) = 1 if and only if (G)1.
(b) s(G) = 2 if and only if (G)2 and G has a set S = {u, v} where u and v are adjacent and |S|2.
(c) s(G) = 3 if and only if s(G) /∈ {1, 2} and G has a set S = {u, v,w} where |S|3 and 〈S〉 is either K3 or
P3 = 〈u, v,w〉 and, in the latter case, |N(u) ∩ S|2 and |N(w) ∩ S|2.
2. s(Kn) = 	n/2
.
3. s(Cn) = 2.
4. (a) s(PmPn) = min{m, n, 3}.
(b) s(CmPn) min{m, 2n, 6}.
(c) s(C3C3) = 4 and s(CmCn) min{2m, 2n, 12}.
5. Let G be a graph with maximum degree three. If G is not a forest, let g be its girth. Deﬁne k to be g if G has at most
one vertex of degree 2, and to be the number of vertices in a shortest path between degree 2 vertices otherwise.






2 if k = 2 or G contains either a K4 − e or
a K3 with a degree 2 vertex,
max{3,min{k, g − 1}} if G contains an induced K2,3 or
a Cg with a degree 2 vertex,
min{k, g} otherwise.
Proof. 1. The sufﬁciency of all parts is straightforward. For necessity, it is immediate that |S| i if s(G)= i, so (1a)
and (1b) are shown. Suppose an s(G)-set is S = {u, v,w}. Since 〈S〉 is connected, 〈S〉 is either K3 which can defend
against any three attacks or P3 = 〈u, v,w〉 which can defend against any three attacks for which an end vertex has at
most two attackers.
2. No set of fewer than 	n/2
 vertices is secure, but one of that number is.
3. Follows from (1).
4. The result for PmPn follows from (1a) or (1b) if min{m, n}2. Otherwise, according to (1c), a corner vertex
and its two neighbors form a minimum secure set. For CmPn, a secure set can be the set of end vertices of the paths
that lie in a single copy of Cm, the vertices in two sequential copies of Pn, or six vertices composed of the end vertices
of four consecutive paths along with the vertices adjacent to the middle vertices of the four. If m = n = 3, any 2 × 2
block of vertices in C3C3 is secure whereas any set S of vertices with 1 |S|3 has |S|< |S|. Finally, for CmCn,
the vertices in any two sequential copies of Cm or Cn form a secure set as do those in any 4 × 4 block of vertices with
the corner vertices removed.
5. The results for s(G) = 1 and s(G) = 2 follow from (1a) and (1b), respectively. Furthermore, any path whose
end vertices are degree 2 in G, any path having g − 1 vertices which contains a degree 2 vertex in G and which
also is contained in a Cg all of whose other vertices have degree 3 in G, and any cycle are all secure sets. Hence the
given values are upper bounds for the indicated conditions. Now suppose S is a minimum secure set such that |S|3,
diam(〈S〉)g − 3 (〈S〉 has at most g − 2 vertices), and k > |S|. Then 〈S〉 is a tree and no two vertices in S can have a
common neighbor in S. Thus, if v is a leaf of 〈S〉 having two neighbors in G, then S − {v} is a smaller secure set, a
contradiction. Therefore, all leaves of 〈S〉 are degree 2 in G, another contradiction since that implies k |S|. The only
remaining case is if 〈S〉 is a path having g − 1 vertices and kg. Since S is secure, either exactly one of its vertices
must have degree 2 in G and it is contained in a Cg whose other vertices have degree 3 in G, or the two leaves of 〈S〉
must have two common neighbors u and v in S. This implies g = 4 and |S| = 3. Then S ∪ {u, v} induces a K2,3. 
Part (5) of Proposition 4 leads to the following corollary.




2 if G contains a K4 − e,
3 if G contains a K2,3,
g otherwise.
3. Characterizations of secure sets
In this section we present three characterizations of secure sets. The ﬁrst involves the vertex connectivity number
(〈S〉) of the subgraph induced by secure subset S of V. We shall employ the fact that, for any X ⊆ S, S − N [X] = ∅
if and only if (X) ∩ S is a disconnecting set of 〈S〉.
Theorem 6. Let G = (V ,E). A set S ⊆ V is secure if and only if |S| |N [S] − S| and every X ⊆ S is S-secure
whenever |X| |N [X] − S| − 1 − (〈S〉).
Proof. When S is secure, S is S-secure and Observation 2 Part 3 guarantees that |S| |N [S] − S|. Observation 2 Part
4 establishes that every X ⊆ S is S-secure, in particular, those subsets X for which |X| |N [X] − S| − 1 − (〈S〉).
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Now assume |S| |N [S]−S| and that everyX ⊆ S is S-secure whenever |X| |N [X]−S|−1−(〈S〉). Suppose, by
way of contradiction, that X={x1, x2, . . . , xk} ⊆ S is a smallest set that is not S-secure. Therefore, k=|X| |N [X]−
S|−(〈S〉). Let A={A1, A2, . . . , Ak} be an arbitrary attack on X, that is, Ai ⊆ N [xi]−S for 1 i |X|, and suppose
X is not defendable against A. From Observation 2 Part 1, we may assume A is a partition of N [X] − S. Further, no set
of A is empty, for otherwise a proper subset of X is attacked by A. Since this set is smaller than X, it is by hypothesis
defendable. Therefore, by Observation 2 Part 2,Xwould be defendable from attack byA. For 1 i |X|, let ai=|Ai |−1
and assume aiai+1 for all i < |X|. Let r be the largest integer for which ar > 0 and set t = a1 + a2 + · · · + ar . Thus,
r t . We also have that |N [X] − S| = t + |X|, implying r t(〈S〉). Suppose |X ∩ S|< t . Then X ∩ S is not a
disconnecting set of 〈S〉, so, by the comment before the theorem, (X∩S)∪X=S implying |X∩S|=|S|−|X|. Now
t = |N [X] − S| − |X| |N [S] − S| − |X| |S| − |X| = |X ∩ S|< t , a contradiction. Therefore, X ∩ S contains at
least t vertices. Now, let Z be any set of t vertices in X ∩ S. Then a special application of Menger’s theorem (see [16,
p. 175, Problem 4.2.28]) shows that there exist t vertex disjoint paths with one path initiating at each vertex of Z and
with ai paths terminating at vertex xi in X for 1 ir .
We now can construct a defense D as follows. Initially set Di = {xi} for 1 ik. Then, for 1 ir , each xi has ai
vertex disjoint paths leading from xi to ai distinct vertices of Z. For each of these paths:
1. set w to the path neighbor of xi and add w to Di
2. while w ∈ X do: if w = xj , j > r , set both Dj and w to the next path vertex.
The constructed D = {D1,D2, . . . , Dk} is a neutralizing defense of attack A. Hence, all attacks upon X can be
defended and X is S-secure, contradicting the assumption that X is not defendable. Thus, S is secure. 
Corollary 7. For any set S, if |S| |N [S] − S| and (〈S〉) |N [X] − S| − |X| for every X ⊆ S, then S is secure.
Next we develop a set theoretic characterization for a set S to be secure. First a characterization for S to be S′-secure
is obtained, and then the goal is achieved by replacing S′ by S. Assume S ⊆ S′ ⊆ V . For an arbitrary attack A of S by
vertices in V − S′, let ax be the number of vertices in V − S′ attacking vertex x ∈ S. For x ∈ S′ − S, deﬁne ax = 0.
Similarly, for an arbitrary defense D, let bx be the number of vertices in S′ defending vertex x ∈ S′. A best defense of
attack A is one for which
∑
(ax − bx) is minimum among all defenses of A, where the sum is taken over all vertices x
with ax > bx . An attack A is defendable if and only if there is a defense for which the above sum is zero. Notice that a
best defense does not imply bxax for all vertices in S.
For any best defense D, another best defense D′ can be derived by employing either of the following transformations
applied to any vertex i for which bi > ai and any vertex j ∈ S′ that is a neighbor of i:
1. If j defends i, let j defend itself.
2. If i defends itself and j defends any vertex other than i, let i defend j.
Observe that, in D′, b′i = bi − 1, b′j = bj + 1, and b′x = bx for every x ∈ S′ − {i, j}. DeﬁneD to be a set composed of
an initial best defense D and those defenses derived from D by the two transformations and from any of the resulting
best defenses. Notice this implies that if bxax in any defense in D, then bxax in all defenses in D. Let V + ⊆ S′
be the vertices x for which bx > ax in at least one defense in D and, ﬁnally, let X = S′ − V +.
Lemma 8. For any x ∈ X, the set of vertices defending x and the vertex defended by x are the same in every defense
in D.
Proof. If x is involved in one of the above transformations, it must correspond to vertex j since vertex i ∈ V +.
Thus, after the transformation, b′x > bx . If bx − ax = 0, the transformation would place x ∈ V +. If bx − ax < 0,
the transformation would produce a better best defense. Thus, both options lead to contradictions and the result
follows. 
Lemma 8 is important in the following result.
Lemma 9. Every x ∈ N [X] ∩ S′ defends a vertex in X in every defense in D.
1712 R.C. Brigham et al. / Discrete Applied Mathematics 155 (2007) 1708–1714
Proof. First consider any x ∈ X and suppose, in the initial defense D, x defends y ∈ V +. From Lemma 8, x will
defend y in every defense inD. Also, since y ∈ V +, there is a defense inD for which by > ay . Then an application of
transformation (1) with i = y and j = x would result in increasing bx , a contradiction to Lemma 8. Hence x defends a
vertex in X in every defense in D.
Next suppose x ∈ (N [X] ∩ S′) − X ⊆ V + and defends a vertex y ∈ V +. It follows that x has a neighbor x′ ∈ X
which, by the last paragraph, does not defend x. We may assume by > ay since, if by = ay , there is a sequence of one
or more of the transformations starting from the initial defense that results in by > ay with x still defending y. Now,
with by > ay , an application of transformation (1) with j = x and i = y results in a defense with x defending itself and,
since bxax before the transformation, bx > ax after it. Following this with transformation (2) with j = x′ and i = x
increases bx′ , contradicting Lemma 8. Thus, once again we must have that x defends a vertex in X in every defense
in D. 
From Lemma 9, if X is not defendable from an attack from N [S] − S′, every vertex in N [X] ∩ S′ defends a vertex in
X. From the paragraph preceeding Lemma 8, X=S′ −V + can contain vertices in S′ −S. Let x be such a vertex. Vertex
x is unattacked, that is, ax = 0 and, since x /∈V +, it must have bx = 0. It follows that each of these vertices defends a
vertex in X ∩ S. Therefore, we may restrict X to be just those vertices of X that are also in S. Since no vertex outside of
this set can defend any vertex in X, we have, for x ∈ X, that∑ bx = |N [X] ∩ S′|<∑ ax |N [X] − S′|. Thus, there
is an X ⊆ S for which |N [X] ∩ S′|< |N [X] − S′|. We make use of this in the next result.
Theorem 10. Set S ⊆ S′ ⊆ V is S′-secure if and only if |N [X] ∩ S′| |N [X] − S′| for all X ⊆ S.
Proof. Necessity is immediate from Observation 2, Parts 3 and 4. When S is not S′-secure, there is an attack that is
not defendable. Lemma 9 and the above discussion show there is an X ⊆ S for which |N [X] ∩ S′|< |N [X] − S′|. 
Substituting S for S′ in Theorem 10 yields the following.
Theorem 11. Set S ⊆ V is secure if and only if |N [X] ∩ S| |N [X] − S| for all X ⊆ S.
The problem of determining if a ﬁxed attackA is defendable, and, if so, producing a defense, can be couched in a linear
programming setting, thereby showing it is solvable in polynomial time. Let the vertices of S be labeled 1, 2, . . . , m
and suppose vertex i has ai attackers for 1 im. In order to indicate possible edges which can be used in a defense,
let cij = 1 if ij is an edge and cij = 0 otherwise. We also deﬁne cii = 1 for 1 im in order to allow a vertex to defend
itself.
Deﬁne a set of variables xij , 1 i, jm, where xij =1 if vertex i defends vertex j and xij =0 otherwise. The possible
values for these variables are further restricted as follows.
1. To enforce that a vertex can defend at most one vertex:
xi1 + xi2 + · · · + xim = 1 for 1 im.
2. To ensure that each vertex, if attack A is defendable, is sufﬁciently defended:
x1j + x2j + · · · + xmj aj for 1jm.
3. To ensure vertices can defend only themselves or neighbors:
0xij cij for 1 i, jm.
Notice that all the coefﬁcients of this formulation are positive one, thereby ensuring any solution will contain only
integral values. Thus, any feasible solution to this system provides a defense for attack A. If there is no feasible
solution, attack A is not defendable. For attacks that are not defendable, one can determine a best possible defense
by incorporating artiﬁcial variables. Observe that this formulation shows that the following decision problem, as well
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as its complement, is polynomial:
A-secure
Instance: Graph G = (V ,E), subset S ⊆ V , attack A on S.
Question: Is the attack A on S defendable?
A ﬁnal characterization of secure sets is given in the next theorem.
Theorem 12. A set S ⊆ V is secure if and only if |S| |N [S] − S| and S − {si} is S-secure for every si ∈ S.
Proof. Necessity follows from Observation 2, Parts 3 and 4. Suppose then that |S| |N [S]−S| and S−{si} is S-secure
for every si ∈ S. Let A be an arbitrary attack on S. If Ai = ∅ for every si ∈ S, then |S| = |N [S] − S| and each Ai has
exactly one vertex and a defense D for S can be constructed by letting Di = {si} for 1 ik. Thus, we may assume
there is a si ∈ S for which Ai = ∅. Then A − {Ai} is an attack on S − {si}. Since S − {si} is S-secure, it has a defense
D′ for which |D′j | |Aj | for every j = i. Then D = D′ ∪ Diwith Di = ∅ is a defense of S for attack A. Thus, every
attack on S can be defended. 
4. Open problems
Many questions remain to be investigated, including the ones listed here. A subset S ⊆ V of graph G = (V ,E) is
said to be insecure if and only if there is subset X ⊆ S such that |N [X] ∩ S|< |N [X] − S|.
1. Is 	(n + 1)/2
 an upper bound for s(G) for any graph G having n vertices?
2. Determine the exact values of s(CmPn) and s(CmCn) for all values of m and n. We suspect the bounds given in
Proposition 4, Parts 4b and 4c are best possible.
3. Determine the complexity of the following decision problems.
(a) Secure Set 1
Instance: Graph G = (V ,E), positive integer K
Question: Is there a secure subset S ⊆ V such that |S|K?
(b) Secure Set 2
Instance: Graph G = (V ,E), subset S ⊆ V
Question: Is S a secure set of G?
(c) k-Secure
Instance: Graph G = (V ,E), subset S ⊆ V , positive integer K
Question: Is every X ⊆ S such that |X| |S| − K S-secure (that is, can S be defended by sacriﬁcing at most K
defenders)?
Consider a true instance G = (V ,E) and S ⊆ V of the complement of Secure Set 2. Theorem 11 shows that S
has a subset X such that |N [X] ∩ S|< |N [X] − S|. If a nondeterministic oracle provides X, the inequality can be
checked in polynomial time. Thus, the complement of Secure Set 2 is in NP, that is, Secure Set 2 is in Co-NP. Further
classiﬁcation of any of these problems, other than they are decidable, remains open.
4. Deﬁne the smallest cardinality of a secure dominating set of graph G as se(G). When is se(G) = s(G)?
5. Given an insecure set S, what is the order of a smallest secure set containing S?
6. Given an insecure set S, does it contain a secure subset?
7. It can be shown that every graph G of order n has a maximal insecure set of cardinality n − 1 − 	(G)/2
, and no
larger set can be insecure. We also have been able to show that every maximal insecure set has at least 	n/2
 − 1
vertices, but it is unknown if this bound is sharp. Determine what a sharp lower bound is for the size of a maximal
insecure set and characterize graphs that achieve it.
8. Is the following Nordhaus–Gaddum bound correct for graphs of order n: s(G) + s(G)n + 1?
9. Call subset S ⊆ V of graph G = (V ,E) k-secure if any attack of size k is defendable. What can be said about
k-secure sets in graphs?
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